Ваенная гісторыя беларускіх земляў (да канца XII ст.)
Том. 2
Ягор Новікаў
Выдавец: Логвінаў
Памер: 300с.
Мінск 2008
Similarly, the economic impact of war in 11th century could be more attributed to the consistent colonization of newly conquered lands than looting.
The place of war in the spiritual culture and system of values of the Ruthenian society changed, too. Previously, the pagans had viewed war as the natural state of things. Everybody could wage war for power, gain and glory. Warriors had been considered to be akin to the beasts and had been believed to derive their strength from the animal world. Finally, they had not been held responsible for their deeds, no matter good or evil. Blind fate had ruled the life of a pagan warrior, leaving him no choice but follow it and accept his lot with dignity.
When Ruthenians adopted Christianity and shunned their pagan beliefs their views on war changed accordingly. This evolution is best represented in «The Story of Barys and Hleb» and Ruthenian chronicles. First, war was pronounced a necessary evil rather than the natural state of things. Second, starting with Uladzimir only the state represented by duke had the legitimate right to wage wars. Third, in compliance with the Bible war could be waged only to repel enemies, protect the helpless and fight criminals. E.g. Uladzimir for a while hesitated to prosecute
criminals for the fear of sin, but then took the advice from the bishops and started using the military force to fight crime. Fourth, now that a warrior was expected to fight for the right cause he could rely on heavenly support and derive his strength from divine sources. Finally, he was free to make the choice between good and evil and bear all responsibility for it. Faced with the temptation to start the war against his elder brother Sviatapo3k, duke Barys refused to take up arms for an unjust cause, got murdered by Sviatapolk and found salvation as a martyr. On the opposite Sviatapolk was doomed for the eternal torture.
The new Christian ideal of the warrior was personified in the figures of military saints. Exported from the Byzantine Empire was the cult of Demetrius and George, soon joint by Barys and Hleb, sanctified by the Ruthenian clergy. The latter two were closer to martyrs than classic warrior saints, yet to an extent they assumed the functions of the warrior saints, in particular assisting Christian warriors on the battlefield. Christianity therefore set a very high and noble standard for the Ruthenian military elite.
The military organizations of the Duchy of Polack and Kyivan Rus’ were developing within the established forms of the warband and the popular militia. Under the command of the duke both parts together constituted the army that was a regular institution of the state. It was aimed at achieving political ends by military means. The warband was a professional military' detachment and the core of the whole army. With the development of cavalry the warband became mounted. It also grew in numbers. In 1093 duke Sviatapolk of Kyiv and Turau had 800 otraks ready to fight. Together with dzetskis and senior warband members the warband could number more than 1,000 warriors.
The need for the mobilization of the popular militia lessened and the degree of the militarization of the society decreased compared to the epic Norse times. Accordingly the militia shrank relative to the quantity of population as the economy growth and the subsequent employment drew people away from the military service. Yet it still grossly outnumbered the warband and was battle-worthy quality wise. In cases of emergency Jaras3au would mobilize the militia by sending an arrow around the country. Now some of the militiamen were mounted, too. The number of mobilized militiamen in wars of Kyivan dukes could reach 3,000— 5,000. The numbers for the Duchy of Polack were smaller, proportional to the size of the territory and population. The militia
kept its old decimal organization but «tens», «hundreds» and «thousands» now were more of formal categories than real numbers. In fact, the contingent of a town with the adjacent area was referred to as a «thousand». A «hundred» was the contingent of a town district, and a «ten» — that of a street. Although the militia was under the general command of the duke, the direct commanders (voevodes) would more and more often be recruited from the townsfolk and be appointed by the local self-government rather than by the duke himself.
The garrisons of towns were staffed by either warband members or militiamen depending on whether a town was ruled directly by the duke or had a degree of self-government.
Hiring Norse mercenaries still was widely practiced in the first half of 11"’ century. Jarashm hired a contingent of 1,000 Norsemen in his struggle for Kyiv. The detachment of Eymund, hired first by Jaraslau and then by Bracyslad of Polack, numbered 600 soldiers.
The dukes of both Kyiv and PoJack often resorted to using the auxiliary troops of allied and dependent lands. Kyivan dukes often had nomadic Pechenegs and Kumans take part in their campaigns, while the Dukes of Polack turned to Lithuanians and Livonians for help.
The arsenal of Ruthenian warriors gradually evolved. Sword was still the preferred weapon of warbands but the decreased militarization of the society and the decline of Norse presence in Rus’ contributed to a less frequent use of swords by militiamen. Militias were predominantly armed with spears and axes. Bow went into decline because of the predominance of close combat. The biggest novelty of protective arms was a long almond-like shield, which originated in Western Europe circa 1000 but was later dubbed Norman. Its emergence is linked to the development of cavalry. The long Norman shield protected a horseman from shoulder to toe and with two fastening belts kept the left hand free to steer the horse.
Many towns and fortresses were still confined to their insular or cape shape. At the same time the urban growth set a task of protecting town suburbs. This situation gave birth to a new compound type of fortification, similar to the compound cape type. The difference was in the fact that with the compound type fortified sites the outer line of walls no longer depended on the landscape. Compound type fortifications were built in Polack,
Smalensk and Viciebsk. So called «round» fortresses adopted from Western Slavs represented an even more drastic departure from the old landscape dependent fortification. They could be built at any location and with their regular round shape provided opportunities for equally dense frontal shooting from any given section of the wall. Round fortresses first emerged in Western Belarusian lands on the border of Rus’ with Yatvingians and Lithuanians and then in Turau land. The best known attempt at building a round fortress in Belarusian lands though was an oval shaped Miensk (Minsk) in the Duchy of Polack.
The biggest technology innovations were: internal wooden frame constructions and external stone-work, used to strengthen the earthen wall; and complex gateways.
Massive construction of wooden castles in Lithuania resulted in some impressive examples of fortification, too. E.g. Impiltis hill-fort in addition to mighty walls had an advanced tunnel-like gateway. Some Lithuanian castles like Apuole were designed for long sieges and had specialized water reservoirs.
Despite the progress of fortification, the attack still had a significant advantage over the defence. As the seizure of Miensk in 1084 by Uladzimir Manamach showed even the best fortresses of the time sometimes could not resist a single sudden attack. The role of sudden attacks, however, started decreasing as generals tended to force the garrison of the besieged fortress to surrender by a long blockade.
Direct action still was the prevailing method of strategy. For example, the whole war between Uladzimir’s sons in 1015-1019 consisted of a series of head-to-head campaigns with both rivals concentrating all of their forces in one point and trying to defeat each other in the general battle.
At the same time indirect forms of strategy found further development in the wars of the Dukes of Potack against Kyivan Rus’. The Duchy of Polack was the smaller and weaker of the two states. It was under a constant threat from Kyiv and therefore had to wage wars to prevent a potential aggression and keep the existing balance of power or shift it in favour of Polack. With little chance to defeat the Kyivan army in a straight battle, the Dukes of Polack preferred to launch pre-emptive strikes with limited goals. Such a strike would normally be launched against an ill-defended periphery of Kyivan Rus’ while Kyivan rulers were busy elsewhere. The seizure of a town and devastation of the adjacent area would undermine
the defensive potential of Kyivan Rus’ and be used as an irrefutable negotiating argument. The efficiency of such a strategy was first proven by Bracysfati’s successful raid on Novgorod in 1021 and the subsequent favourable peace treaty. Usiasiah repeated his father’s success by seizing and plundering Novgorod in 1066 and threatening Smalensk in 1078. Despite a number of tactical defeats, his formidable strategic skill won Usiaslati the reputation of one of the best generals of his time.
Both direct and indirect strategy most often took the shape of an offence rather than a defence. Even the wars of the Dukes of Poiack that ultimately had defensive goals were waged in an offensive manner.
Tactics also became more complicated. Instead of the monolithic «wall» a typical battle order of the Poiack or Kyivan army would consist of three separate tactical units: centre and two flanks. This battle order was more flexible and better fit for manoeuvring. Each unit could be a mixed formation of cavalry and infantry. Alternately, infantry stayed in the centre while cavalry could be placed on flanks. It could easier protect its flanks or outflank the enemy. In the Battle of Koloksha against Aleh of Chernihiv in 1096 Mstislav of Novgorod used his longer front line to outflank Aleh, attack him in the rear and win the battle. Light cavalry and light infantry were often sent ahead for reconnaissance or to engage the enemy in the battle. Sometimes a separate detachment could be placed in ambush with the purpose of attacking the enemy in the rear. A sudden attack of Norse mercenaries from the ambush helped Jaraslau win the Battle of Lubech in 1015. While the new tactics was potentially more efficient than the previous one, it required a much better control of the army on part of the command. Sometimes that was not the case. One of the reasons of Jaraslau’s defeat from Boleslaw and Sviatapolk in the Battle of Western Buh in 1018 was the absence of connection and mutual aid between his detachments in the face of a blistering Polish attack.
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