Ваенная гісторыя беларускіх земляў (да канца XII ст.)
Том. 2
Ягор Новікаў
Выдавец: Логвінаў
Памер: 300с.
Мінск 2008
revolted against duke Rascisiau after an unsuccessful expedition against Turau. In 1185 Smalensk militia refused to fight against Kumans and forced duke Davyd to return back home.
To compensate for the reluctance of common folk to fight, Ruthenian dukes more and more often had to resort to the help from their vassals and auxiliaries. The Dukes of Poiack and Miensk relied mostly on Lithuanians. In the battle of Haradziec between the troops of Poiack and Miensk in 1162 the army of Miensk consisted completely of Lithuanians. When Lithuania gained its independence in 1180s, it first became a dangerous enemy of its former seniors and then their ally. In 1198 at Vialikiye Luki and in 1200 at Kokenhusen Poiack and Lithuanian warriors again fought side by side.
It was not long before the growing Lithuanization of the Poiack army made the Poiack society think that energetic Lithuanian dukes and their brave warriors contributed to the defence and security of Poiack much more than Ruthenian ruling families, hopelessly stuck in their dynastic disputes. A real possibility of substitution of the existing elites by Lithuanians became visible. In exchange Poiack attracted Lithuanians by its developed economy and trade, rich cultural tradition and elaborate legislation. Some other Ruthenian duchies were to follow the path of Poiack. A synthesis of Lithuanian military power and Ruthenian civil tradition was to become the cornerstone of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
This process can be roughly compared to the Barbarization of the Roman army in lsl—3rd centuries A.D. when Barbarians were often promoted to the positions of high commanders and could eventually ascend the imperial throne. When the Roman Empire fell in 476 A.D., the lines of division between Romans and Barbarians had essentially blurred. As a result, the kingdoms of Goths in Italy and Spain and the kingdom of Franks in Gaul combined both Barbarian and Roman traditions.
The economy of Rus’ in 12lh century was debilitated by internal wars just as badly as its political system. Dynastic wars could hardly achieve any meaningful goals yet provided endless opportunities for looting. Some rulers did not hesitate to take advantage of it. Hleb of Miensk was the most known of them. According to some sources, he used his raids on neighbouring lands to capture people and sell them later as slaves. Druck was used as the main river port for slave trade. Hleb then would use
the profits to finance his further military activities. The principle «War pays for war» worked some 500 years before Wallenstein. What went around came around, though. In 1117 Hleb had to capitulate to Kyivan duke Uladzimir Manamach. Druck was taken by storm. Its residents were taken prisoners and forcefully resettled in a newly built town of Zhelni.
The wars of 12th century also contributed to the emergence of certain cultural stereotypes. Ruthenian dukes and their environment put a lot of effort into emphasizing their status of the military elite by developing a chivalrous code of conduct and glorifying it in the literature. The most valued quality was nobleness. Some excellent examples of that were registered in chronicles. When Vsevolod of Pskov, an old enemy of the Dukes of Polack, was expelled in 1138 from his town and had to pass through the Polack territory, duke Vasilka (Vasilko, 1132-1144) of Polack met him on the border and accompanied him all the way to make sure that his unfortunate guest reached his destination safely. Ruthenian dukes also liked to show off their courage, pride and dignity sometimes verging on bravado. Mscislau of Smalensk in 1173 played a practical joke on his powerful enemy Andrey of Suzdal by cutting off the beard of Andrey’s envoy Mikhn and sending him back to his duke.
Yet the chivalry could not disguise two facts. First, Ruthenian dukes demonstrated their noble qualities in the atmosphere of endless wars that badly hurt other layers of society. Second, their courage and pride were often self-indulgent and had such downsides as vanity, selfishness and gratuitous cruelty. For these reasons the attitude of the society towards the princely corporate culture, reflected in the contemporary literature, was ambiguous. On one hand common people appreciated the courage of dukes when it contributed to the struggle against external enemies or protection of the weak. On the other hand they openly condemned dukes for meaningless belligerence. The famous «Lay of Igor’s Campaign» splendidly presents this common view of Ruthenian rulers reflecting both their courageous nobleness and selfish vanity. Both images of the Ruthenian dukes that emerged in 12th century, the chivalrous one and the critical one, accompanied them for centuries to come.
The military organization of Belarusian lands in 12lh century became quite complex. First, each independent statelet had its own army. Second, as the princely families branched out, the
senior dukes made dukes from junior branches their vassals. In their turn junior dukes could have their own princeling vassals. Every duke from the senior one in Po3ack. Smalensk or Turah to a very minor princeling had his own warband. Therefore a united army, called up for a certain campaign, was a loose crowd of separate dukes' warbands ranked in accordance with the hierarchy of vassalage. Skill wise warbands were as professional as ever yet the army of warbands was unreliable because of constant political infighting between seniors and vassals and even allies. Yet as war was becoming less of a state-wide cause and more of a dynastic affair, the dukes had to rely more and more on warbands and less on popular militias. The warband was gradually turning from a battle brotherhood into a feudal troop. The combined number of all warband soldiers of all dukes of Polack land in 12th century equalled 3,400-3,500.
Militias shrank even further, compared to 11"’ century, due to a general reluctance of common folk and civil aristocracy to fight. Under the normal circumstances only one of 30 battle-worthy men was subject to mobilization. In case of an extraordinary danger the norm was one of 12. Yet even these modest norms often were not observed and the actual numbers were smaller. Proceeding from these data the total number of men subject to mobilization in Polack land under the normal circumstances was about 2,300 and could reach 5,000—6,000 in case of emergency. The numbers for Smalensk and Turau lands were comparable.
The number of armed Lithuanians who served in Polack army first as vassals and auxiliaries and then as allies constantly grew and by late 12,h century roughly equalled that of native Polack residents.
The arms in the described time became heavier. The Carolingian sword was replaced with the Romanic or Capetingian one, which was 1.2 metres long, 2 kg heavy and had a long handle and a crossing. Cavalry started using pikes with tetrahedral heads designed for ramming blows. The horseman would clasp the pike tight against his torso with his elbow, using all of his momentum to pierce the enemy. Protective arms followed the trend. Mailcoats became longer and sometimes had long sleeves and hood for head protection. Soldiers also frequently wore lamellar and scaly armours.
Fortification only had moderate innovations. Further spreading of round fortresses and frequent construction of watchtowers
(e.g. in Davyd-haradok and Carkovisca) were the main developments. However, one could argue that Ruthenians had learnt to build decent fortresses already in 11'1’ century. Yet it was in 12"' century when they learnt to defend them successfully. Wellorganized guard service and sorties that disrupted enemy’s activities were the major factors that contributed to the success of defence. One of the factors that helped Jury Jarasiavic to withstand the ten-week long siege of Turau in 1158 was his pacifist propaganda among the enemy troops. The success of defence gave boost to the construction of small private castles like Mscibava (Mstibovo) and Viscyn (Vischin), which now had good chances to withstand sieges.
The art of war of 12"' century gained a bad reputation among later military historians, who considered it primitive at best and non-existent at worst. Indeed, the political situation was very unstable and sometimes chaotic. No matter how brilliant a military victory was, it rarely led to meaningful political results. As a result, the rulers seldom set themselves big purposes. Small time political goals led to small time strategy. Wars were often reduced to pirate raids and simple head-to-head clashes. Yet this is only part of the truth. 12th century Ruthenian generals had to act in the situation, where wars were increasingly waged by professionals, who had equal arms and battle training in all Ruthenian duchies. It took a superior strategic thinking and tactical skill to beat an otherwise equal enemy. When generals had decent resources and favourable political situation on their side, they sometimes demonstrated outstanding examples of the art of war, undeservedly forgotten later.
An excellent example of strategic skill was the concentric offensive of Mstislav of Kyiv on Polack land in 1128. He divided his troops into four columns, which had to attack the most important towns around Potack: Zaslauje (Zaslavl), Lahojsk (Logoysk), Barysaii (Borisov) and Druck. The concentric form of the offensive was supposed to force Davyd, the Duke of Polack, to scatter his forces. The fifth column had to advance on Polack land from north and further divert the attention of defenders. Mstislav himself stayed in Kyiv to coordinate the whole operation. The invading troops attacked their goals simultaneously on August 10—11, 1129 and seized Zaslauje and Lahojsk, completely paralyzing the defence of the country. They did not even need to engage in battle with the army of Polack or besiege the capital as
Davyd had to capitulate. Implementation of Mstislav's brilliant plan was possible thanks to his superb control over the advancing armies and precise coordination of their actions.
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